Hacking Report For Our IBM i – 2013 in Review

By Rich Loeber

In January of 2013 year, we issued our first Hacking Report for our IBM i system.  At that time, I promised to publish additional reports of what we are seeing on this test server.  This is our final report for the 2013 and I want to wrap of this one year experiment with our fourth quarter results and some observations about the entire year.

During the final three month period for 2013 we observed a hacking results that were remarkably consistent with the three previous quarters.  The bulk of hacking attempts mounted against our test server were once again in the area of FTP Signon and Telnet Signon.

Once again, someone knocked on the door of our test server 14 times a day trying to gain access.  This attack rate was remarkably consistent for the entire year.

Some interesting things to note ….

Thanks to our SafeNet/i exit point control software, we successfully thwarted 847 attempts to gain access via FTP and another 428 attempts to get a Telnet signon session during the final quarter of the year.   For the year, we was almost 4000 FTP hack attempts and just under 2000 Telnet tries.  The take home lesson is that you absolutely must take life on the Internet seriously.  Our server is small potatoes and does not have any high value assets on it, but hackers are there knocking at the door on a regular basis anyway.  I think it is just because it is there and they have been unsuccessful.

Brute force FTP attacks continued during the final quarter.  Once again, the profile named ADMINSTRA was the most popular one used.  In fact, this was true for each quarter during the year.  Other profile names used included ADMIN, REMOTE, SCANNER, SYS, BACKUPEXEC and WWW-DATA.  Once again, and this was consistent during the whole year, none of the typical Q profiles were attempted.

We also continue to see certain IP addresses with repeated access attempts.  The leading violator for the final quarter traced back to The RIPE network in The Netherlands.  The next two highest both traced back to the Asia Pacific Network Information Center in Australia.

For the full year, our server posted close to 1 million network transactions.  This is nothing in today’s computing environment, some of our customer’s servers can record that level of activity in just a few minutes.  But, taken as a whole for the year, 0.5% of those network access attempts were not authorized by us.  Hackers, you have to take them seriously.  Failure to do so will get you in the headlines as the next Target.

This will conclude our year of tracking hacker activity on our server.  If you have questions about details of the report, feel free to contact me directly by email (rich at kisco.com).

Learning To Be A Security Officer

By Rich Loeber

I have been asked several times recently “How did you learn so much about security on the IBM i?”.  In this tip, I will try to let you know how I got to this point and, perhaps, it will help you on your journey as well.

First, you have to remember that I have been working on computer systems since my first job as a data control clerk in 1965.  During that time, I’ve moved through just about every aspect of the computing field from data entry clerk, system operator, programmer, systems analyst, project manager, department manager, independent contractor and software developer.  All along the way, security issues have come up and had to be researched and dealt with.  So, I guess some longevity contributes to where I am today.  But, old age is not an option to a lot of aspiring security officers for today’s IBM i installations.

As I think back over this history, several concepts come to mind that have helped me strengthen my understanding of computer security.

First and foremost is reading.  I am, by nature, an avid reader.  Over the course of my career, I have found that reading is crucial to staying current on what’s going on in the field.  This is more true today than it has ever been since things are changing faster now than at any time that I can recall.

When choosing what to read, I’d recommend a holistic approach that includes general computing topics, IBM i specific topics and security topics.  In today’s world, this means reading magazines, Internet publications and technical manuals.

There are a few magazines that are still in print for the IBM i world, although it is hard to know how much longer that will last.  Almost all of their content, however, is available on-line at websites maintained by the publishers.  Some of these charge a fee for access, but the charges are not prohibitive and the content is generally well worth the price of admission.  These publications tend to focus on “what’s new” topics, but their archives are a good source of general information that you will find most helpful.

For security topics on your IBM i, there is nothing better than going to the source …. the security manuals that come with your system.  These are available on a CD that came with your system and also on-line from the “IBM i and System i Information Center” (http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/eserver/ibmi.html).  The current manuals for all supported versions of the operating system are there along with an extensive library on security topics.  You can’t find better details than looking at these documents from IBM as they tell you exactly how the designers intend for security to be implemented on your system.  I know, reading the manuals can be tedious, but they’re really not that bad.  When I’m writing a tip for publication, I often find myself mired in them to get the exact details of how something works, according to IBM.

Another good way to stay current on what’s going on in the IBM i security field is to participate in an on-line discussions forum.  For me, I like David Gibb’s “midrange.com” (http://www.midrange.com/).  You can sign up for quite a few different forums and then just sit back and monitor the traffic via email.  The group that participates is great at answering your questions and you can read what others are doing.  I’m amazed at how much I pick up just by monitoring the email traffic.

So, the first step in improving your understanding of security is reading.  One thing to remember is that reading takes time.  I have the luxury these days of being able to set my own schedule and I make time for reading a priority.  You will need to dedicate time during your busy week for this activity.  Failure to do so could leave you out of date.

If you have any questions about this topic you can reach me at rich at kisco.com,  All email messages will be answered as quickly as possible.

Rescinding Access Rights

By Rich Loeber

Most of the time, as an IBM i security officer, you are concerned with granting access rights to users.  To do this, you need to know what the user’s job responsibilities are and what they will be doing within the computing environment.  Based on existing security policies for your shop, you then configure security for each user so that they can get at the computing resources they need to do their job easily, smoothly and securely.

Once you have a user set up and running, however, I think they seem to fall off our radar since we’re then occupied with getting the next user(s) setup and configured.  You tend to address those areas where you have immediate demands at the expense of others.

One important thing to keep track of, however, are situations where access rights need to be modified or rescinded.  The most glaring situation is when someone leaves the company.  You should have a clearly developed plan of action to implement when someone leaves.  This plan should include:

  • Deactivating their user profile
  • Identifying any objects owned by their profile and reassigning them
  • Removing access rights for objects not owned by them
  • Deleting the user profile after all else is done

Just deactivating a profile is not sufficient.  Batch jobs can still be run under an inactive user profile and those jobs will still have rights to the object set that was defined for that user.  So, you must take the additional action of removing those access rights.  Rescinding access rights is just as important to a secure installation as granting those rights.

Chances are, your IBM i is currently sitting with loads of unnecessary access rights in place for people who are long gone.  Each one of those access rights is a potential security exposure and should be dealt with.  You should review the way the user was initially configured when their access rights were granted and then go through and reverse the process.

Making this work depends you being in the loop when someone leaves the company.  In a small shop, you normally learn this by word of mouth.  But, in any size shop, a formal notification process needs to be put in place to guarantee that inactive profiles are dealt with promptly.  This can be especially important if someone leaves on bad terms.  A firm procedure has to be in place with your HR staff and it must be enforced.

The other situation you need to be prepared for is when someone has a change in job responsibilities.  In this situation, you will not only need to grant new access rights for the user, but you will also have to backtrack and possibly remove some earlier rights that have already been granted.  Again, careful coordination must be worked out with your HR folks.  You are more likely to hear about this through less formal channels since the user will need to get reconfigured in order to start their new responsibilities.

If you have any questions about this topic you can reach me at rich at kisco.com,  All email messages will be answered as quickly as possible.

Do You Believe Security Is An Issue?

By Rich Loeber

I am amazed at how many companies and organizations I run into where computer security is lax and nobody seems to care very much.  Recently I heard from a business associate who is just getting started in a new position.  He told me that his company’s IBM i is connected directly to the Internet with no protection at all, not even a firewall or even a router.  He demonstrated to his new boss how he could quickly hack into the system, track down the ID and password of a security officer and then sign on using that profile.  I won’t tell you how he did this, but it was not rocket science.  They are shopping for security protection for their IBM i now, but how did they get to this point to begin with?

What these organizations need is a Security Evangelist.  Someone who knows what the problem is and really believes in the message.  The dictionary contains several definitions of “evangelist” and the one I’m thinking of is “a person marked by evangelical enthusiasm for or support of any cause.”.  If you don’t believe the message, then you can’t sell it to your organization’s decision makers.

I then thought back over my almost 50 year career to try and pinpoint those places where I bought into the computer security message.  I can think of three events that really got me convinced that this is a legitimate issue.

When I started in the computing field in 1965, computers were new and companies that had them liked to show them off.  It was not unusual to have a glass enclosed computer room with open access to the public to walk by and watch the computer in operation.  Then, there was a Viet Nam war protest bombing of one of these computer centers and, overnight, they got boarded up and physically secured.  Companies realized that they were dependent on the computers for many operations and the public display put them at risk.

At around this same time, in 1973, along came the Equity Funding fraud.  This was a computerized fraud scheme where a financial conglomerate engaged in fraud on a huge scale to maintain a high stock price and fool Wall Street and investors.  At its height, the scandal involved as many as 100 employees who used their computer system to create fictitious insurance policies.  At one point during the fraud, someone estimated that if the insurance policies being written continued at the same growth rate, they would end up writing more policies than there were people in the US.  It was dramatized in the made for TV movie, “The Billion Dollar Bubble” staring James Woods and Sam Wanamaker.  I could not find the movie available on NetFlix or at Amazon, but if you can see this movie, it is very convincing.

These two events, which happened quite close to each other, got me thinking that the computer security issue was a real issue and not just something being touted by IBM to sell more of their services.

The last event that turned me into a security evangelist was reading the book “The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage” by Clifford Stoll.  This book, published in 1990, starts with a college IT guy from Berkeley trying to track down a 75 cent billing error.  His search leads him into the then new world of computer hackers on a global basis.  This book is still available from Amazon.com and if you’ve never read it, you should.

If you don’t believe in the computer security message, then you can’t convince others.  I became convinced by just keeping my eyes and ears open to what was going on around me.  If you’re working in the computer security field, you need to be an evangelist and get everyone at your organization on board.  If you don’t believe the message, how can you expect the rest to?  I think this is what’s needed today.  There is still just too much laxness in the field.

If you have security was stories you’d like to share, you can reach me at rich at kisco.com.  All email messages will be answered and I might even use some of your stories in future posts.

Restricting Use Of Certain System Commands

By Rich Loeber

When your IBM i is prepared in the factory, it is set so that most system commands and APIs have a public authority of *USE.  This setting will let anyone use just about any command or API on your system.  But, some of those commands and APIs could be used for malicious purposes.  This tip will show you a way that IBM has provided in the operating system to easily restrict those commands and APIs that can be most problematic.

The secret to this is the Revoke Public Authority (RVKPUBAUT) command.  This command, which calls a program named QSECRVKP in library QSYS, can be used to change the public authority for a host of commands and APIs to *EXCLUDE.  Doing this will allow you to control exactly which user profiles will have access to these commands so that you know who will be trusted with them.

Before you run out and execute the RVKPUBAUT command, you need to know what it is going to change on your system.  (For example, it restricts the RSTOBJ and RSTLIB commands.)  To get a full understanding of which commands and APIs will be changed, you can either take a look in the system documentation or, better yet, you can retrieve the CL program source for the QSECRVKP program and examine it yourself.   You can use the following command to retrieve the source code for this purpose:


This assumes that you already have a source physical file in your library named QCLSRC.

When you run this command, there is a single parameter.  You need to supply the name of the library where these objects are stored.  At a minimum, you should run the command for the QSYS library.  If you have more than one national language on your system, you should also run the command for every QSYSxxx library on your system.

If you see commands and/or APIs where you do not want to change the system default, you can make changes to the retrieved CL source program and recompile it.  Do not place the newly compiled program back into QSYS as that will destroy the original as shipped from the factory.  It would be best to put the copy in a different library along with your own copy of the command object named RVKPUBAUT.  Change the library settings on your copy of the command to point to your modified version of the program.  Then, when you run the command, run it from your library and not from the QSYS library.

You should also be aware that running the RVKPUBAUT command will change the public setting for the root directory of the IFS on your system.  It will change it to *USE unless it is already at that level or lower.

Once you have these commands and APIs restricted, you can then go about authorizing them to the specific individuals in your organization that really do need their use.  The best way to set this up is to create an authorization list for this set of users and then set up each of the commands and APIs to point to the authorization list.  Then, as people come and leave, a simple change to the authorization list will take care of all authorization issues to these restricted use commands and APIs.

If you have any questions about this topic you can reach me at rich at kisco.com,  I’ll try to answer any questions you may have.  All email messages will be answered.

And More Tips for Securing FTP on your IBM i

By Rich Loeber

For the last few months, I’ve been writing about the security exposure from FTP server running on your IBM i box (Power System i/i5/iSeries/AS400).  I started by describing FTP as being the access weapon of choice by many hackers, especially those just starting out.  This was confirmed by our most recent Hacker Report.  Last time around, I talked about a couple of simple suggestions on how to get this situation under control.  Today, I’ll add a couple more tips into the mix to help keep a lid on safeguarding your system from an FTP intrusion.

First, there are lots of good reasons why you want to allow FTP access to your system.  It is an easy way to upload and download data to and from your system from remote locations.  You can also use it for program maintenance from one IBM i to another by moving save files between systems.  Many IBM i software vendors, including my company, distribute software updates using some form of an FTP connection to your system.  So, don’t be afraid of it, but use it wisely.  You can see my last two articles on FTP here and here.

One thing to keep in mind when thinking about FTP is that all the rules of OS security apply to someone connecting to your system.  In order to gain access, they must have a valid user profile and password.  Once they sign on, your current OS security plan will be in place.  So, having a good security implementation tied in to your established user profiles will go a long way towards keeping your data safe.  One additional fact to add into your mix is that in order for data to be accessible to FTP, it must have a minimum security setting of *USE.  If you have a user profile that is regularly using FTP and there are concerns about access, make sure that they do not have a minimum setting of *USE for any objects you do not want them working with.

A problem can easily come up, however, when a user profile is used in different contexts.  By this, I mean when a user has access to certain sensitive objects for their daily work flow that are accessed by program control.  But, that user is also an FTP user and logs in to do file transfers using FTP.  Having different contexts could create a security exposure.  When this user signs on using FTP, they will still have access to the sensitive data files that they are authorized for from their daily work flow.  If this situation exists, you need to address a way to deal with it.

One method, as discussed last time around, might be addressed by implementing controls through the FTP server exit point.  You might also think to issue a second user profile to the user for FTP use.  This solution is not great since the user can still, by choice, establish an FTP connection under their primary user profile and gain access to sensitive data that way.  Far and away, the best solution is through additional exit point controls.  This could be set up to disallow an FTP connection under certain known profiles, thereby forcing the user to make their FTP connection through a secondary profile that you provide.  If you don’t want to tackle implementing your own exit point programming, there are several products available on the market from IBM i developers, including SafeNet/i from my company.

The Sytem i OS also supports profile swapping, which could be another solution to this problem.  Using swapping, the user signs on with one profile, but then the OS swaps their profile to look and act like a different profile.  Information about this technique can be found at the IBM Information Center and has been a part of the OS since V4R5.

If you have any questions about this topic you can reach me at rich at kisco.com,  I’ll try to answer any questions you may have.  All email messages will be answered.

Hacking Report For Our IBM i – 3rd Qtr 2013

By Rich Loeber

In January of this year, Kisco Information Systems issued our first Hacking Report for our IBM i system.  At that time, I promised to publish additional reports of what we are seeing on this test server.  This is our report for the third quarter of 2013 and represents activity observed from July 1st through the end of September.

During this three month period, we observed a slight decrease in the volume of network transactions on our system, less than 1% in total.  At the same time, we saw a drop in the number of illegal access attempts that were rejected by our SafeNet/i software.  From 1,417 rejections last quarter, we saw an 8.4% decrease down to 1,209.  This represents an average of 14 unauthorized access attempts every day, down from 16 last quarter.

Life on the Internet continues to be unsafe.  Having someone knock on the door of my primary server 14 times a day trying to get in is not my idea of fun.  But this is what passes for “normal” in today’s internetworked world.

Some interesting things to note ….

On our server, the unauthorized access attempts continue to fall into two categories.  The miscreants attempt to access the system by FTP and Telnet.

SafeNet/i on our FTP Server on the IBM i OS rejected 792 access attempts which represents a decrease from last quarter.  During this time, the number of legitimate FTP access attempts was 746, so the unauthorized attempts exceeded the legitimate attempts.  We serve client requirements and software development needs using FTP, so we have to keep the FTP server active.  This is a clear warning message, however, that if you are keeping the FTP server active on your system, you really need to have access controls in place like those provided by SafeNet/i.

During this quarter, however, we saw that brute force FTP attacks using a large number of different common user profiles disappeared.  In its place, we are seeing repeated attempts to gain access using very common user profiles but cycling through multiple passwords on each attempt.  Using this method, the most popular user profiles used were ADMINISTRA, MYSQL, APACHE, TEST, TEST1, TEST12, TEST123 and WWW-DATA.  All of these profiles are common in the Unix world, so it appears that the IBM i platform is still not well recognized.

For unauthorized Telnet access attempts, we saw an increase in activity, nearly doubling, back to the level we observed during our first quarter report.  The access attempts via Telnet tend to come in single attempts or at the most, two or three successive attempts.  SafeNet/i captures these before an actual signon screen is presented, so they never get to the feature in IBM’s i OS that forces a profile to go inactive.  (The same is true for the way we are intercepting unauthorized FTP attempts.)

We also continue to see certain IP addresses with repeated access attempts.  The leading violator for this quarter traced back to Bright House Networks in Florida.  The next three highest all traced back to the Asia Pacific Network Information Center in Australia.

Another trend that we note that is disturbing is that for the 92 days covered by our study, there were only 5 days with no malicious activity.  That means that almost every day our server sits out there, someone is trying their hand at gaining access illegally.

We will continue to review our server’s status on a quarterly basis and report the results on our blog space.  If you have questions about details of the report, feel free to contact me directly by email (rich at kisco.com).

More Tips for Securing IBM i FTP

By Rich Loeber

A few weeks ago, I published a tip about the security exposure that FTP represents on your IBM i platform.  That tip has generated some interesting feedback along with some ideas from readers on how they address the issue.  This tip features some additional ideas for you to protect yourself from FTP abusers.

First and foremost is this.  If you don’t use FTP, or you only use it on rare occasions, then don’t leave the FTP server active on your system.  You can check to see if the FTP server function is active on your system by running the following command:


Look for jobs listed named QTFTPnnnnn.  If FTP is active, you will find several of these jobs shown.  To turn the FTP server off, run the ENDTCPSVR command specifying the *FTP server option.  Most systems come from IBM with the FTP server set to start automatically whenever TCP/IP is started.  You can change this by running the Change FTP Attributes (CHGFTPA) command.  Prompt it with the F4 key and check the first parameter.  If it is set to *YES, then FTP is going to start automatically at every IPL.  Changing this to *NO will stop this from happening.

In our shop, we use FTP enough during the course of the day that we keep the FTP server up and active.  But, we have job scheduler entries in the system to turn it off at the end of the day and then restart it every morning.  That way, for 24 hours of possible exposure, 16 of those hours are completely protected.  On the rare occasion when we need FTP during off hours, it is a simple matter to log in and start it again manually.

If the FTP server is inactive, then it cannot be misused.

The other good way to protect yourself from FTP abuse is through the implementation of exit point programs.  The FTP server has an exit point that can be used to filter incoming requests.  This is also true of the Telnet server, another point of possible abuse.  One reader of my last tip suggested implementing the freeware SECTCP utility written by the former IBMer Giovanni B. Perotti.  This utility is available for free download, after a simple registration process, from the following website:


I have downloaded and reviewed this code, but have not implemented since I have my own exit point software already active.  But, the reader swears by the code and Mr. Perotti certainly has a terrific reputation in the IBM i family of users.  So, if you’ve been thinking about implementing exit point controls, this might be any easy entry point for getting started.  The source code is all included with the download and, in fact, everything needs to be compiled in order to install the software.  The user instructions on getting started all appear to be fairly simple.

Also, if you don’t want the bother of maintaining your own exit point code, there are quite a few very good products available from reputable IBM i software developers today.  FTP and Telnet controls are just the tip of the iceberg where exit programming for security is concerned.  I, of course, recommend my own product: SafeNet/i.

If you have any questions about this topic you can reach me at rich at kisco.com,  I’ll try to answer any questions you may have.  All email messages will be answered.

Watch Out For FTP On Your IBM i

By Rich Loeber

FTP (File Transfer Protocol) is a nice and easy way to communicate between systems.  With FTP on your IBM i, you can transfer files to other systems, including other IBM i’s, with ease.  You can also use it to move programs and files between systems, all with relative ease.  But, increasingly, FTP is also becoming the hackers weapon of choice when cruising the Internet.  And, with FTP’s QUOTE command (among others), a knowledgeable hacker could do some serious damage to your system.

I tell you this based on personal experience with my own IBM i.  In a recent 7 day period, I identified more than 1,500 attempts to sign-on to my system from people not authorized.  All of these were malicious hacking attempts.  When I did a Trace Route on many of these, they pointed back to source IP addresses in The Netherlands, China, Colombia, Russia and other parts unknown.  Some attempts would not even trace back successfully.

I initially thought that nobody would bother my system since it is just a numbered address with no DNS entry to make it easy to find.  But, this is clearly not the case.  Some hackers use automated attack programs to just cycle through entire IP address ranges, and these are the folks who regularly stop in at my system.

The method used, from my personal observation, is to break in using the same user profile, usually ADMINISTRATOR, trying a different password every few seconds.  They will often cycle through and retry the same password more than once.  I’ve observed one break-in artist try this 850 times in a row over a period of several hours.

I know all this about my system because I monitor all network traffic and track it using our exit point software.  We have our system configured to only permit FTP access from trusted IP addresses.  The list is, necessarily, very small.  This protects our system from malicious remote access via FTP.  Also, if a hacker were to get past this check (which they never have so far), our system has no default passwords, so trying to cycle through known IBM i profiles and default passwords will also end up in failure.

So, what can you do to protect your system from FTP attackers?

First, make sure that you don’t have any default passwords set up on your system.  Use the Analyze Default Passwords (ANZDFTPWD) command from the SECTOOLS menu for this.  Initially, run it with the *NONE option for the ACTION parameter just to get a listing.  Then, when you’ve reviewed the list, make sure that the profiles with default passwords have their passwords reset to either a different, unique password or are set to *NONE.

Next, implement some sort of IP packet testing to only accept FTP connections from trusted IP addresses.  You can do this like we do using an exit program attached to the FTP sign-on server.  Or, if you have a fairly recent version of the OS, you can use the IP packet filtering capabilities in IBM i Navigator.  This will let you allow known IP addresses, or address ranges, to access your system while keeping everyone else out.  When setting this up, make sure you keep an active connection to your system while you are testing so that you don’t accidentally shoot yourself in the foot and lock out all access to your system.  Remember, the IP packet filtering will apply to all users connecting to your system, not just FTP users, so this will be a bigger job than you may think starting out.

If you have any questions about this topic you can reach me at (rich at kisco dot com),  I’ll try to answer any questions you may have.  All email messages will be answered.

Tracking User Profile Changes

By Rich Loeber

In response to a recent tip, I heard from a reader who suggested a good technique that they use for managing a large base of user profiles on their system.  They submitted this suggestion and I’ve been playing with it and it really does give you the basis for managing your user profile base quite nicely.

What this security officer does is to periodically create a database file of the basic information set up for the entire user profile base.  They then compare this to a version of the database to one created a couple of weeks earlier.  Through a series of Query reports, they are able to list activity in the user profile base that gives them exception reports to review.

To get started, with this approach, you need to create your baseline or historical database.  This is done using the Display User Profile (DSPUSRPRF) command.  Select all profiles for basic information and specify an *OUTFILE.  Then sit back and wait a few days, or as my reader suggested, two weeks.  You may want to wait longer depending on how much time you have and how large your user profile base is.

Then, after the selected time period, run the Display User Profile (DSPUSRPRF) command again, but specify the output to a different *OUTFILE database.  Once you have these two files, you can then run a series of Query reports that compare the two files.

My reader recommends at least four reports, but when you get the hang of this, additional reports may be helpful.  The four reports that they work with are:

•    New User Profiles Added
•    Old User Profiles Deleted
•    User Profiles with no Sign-on Activity
•    User Profiles with changes to their Special Authorities

Using IBM i Query, this is really quite easy.  You can match the two files on the user profile field and select different key match criteria depending on the exact report that you are going to create.  In some cases, you’ll want records on one file but not on the other and vice versa.  In other cases, you will want to look at profiles that are on both files but have field mismatches.

Then, when you’re all done with your reporting, copy the current user profile database over into your historical user profile database and wait another couple of weeks to repeat the process.

These exception reports will show you significant change areas in your user profile base.  You can verify that new profiles added are valid and the same for deleted profiles.  For profiles with no sign-on activity, you can check to see if the users are just on vacation or are actually gone from the company.  For users whose special authorities have changed, you can verify that the changes were warranted.

Other reports you might want to consider are users with group profile changes, users with expired passwords and much more, limited only by your imagination.

If you’re interested, I’ve created the four query reports and a CL program that ties this all together.  If you’d like a copy of these in a save file so you can load them directly onto your system, just ask.  If you have any questions about this topic you can reach me at rich at kisco.com,  I’ll try to answer any questions you may have.  All email messages will be answered.