Tracking User Profile Signon

By Rich Loeber

I recently received email from a reader asking me how they could track sign-on activity for their security officer user profiles.  The objective was to have a record of every time someone started a terminal session from one of these very powerful user profiles.  Since these profiles have so much power to update and change your system, having a record of when and where these sessions are started is a good idea.  Fortunately, there is a fairly easy way to do this within the operation system on your IBM i.

With each user profile on your system, there is an “Initial program to call” (INLPGM) parameter.  Whenever someone signs onto your system, the operating system checks this parameter and, if there is a valid program present, calls it.  You can take this feature and use it to create your log of user profile sign-on activity for selected user profiles.

The first step is to create a simple CL program.  When the operating system calls the initial program, no parameters are passed, making your task quite easy.  In your CL program, you will need to retrieve the user profile using the Retrieve Job Attributes (RTVJOBA) command.  Armed with the current user profile, then just send a message using the Send Program Message (SNDPGMMSG) command to a pre-defined message queue indicating that the user profile has performed a sign-on operation.  When I was testing this, I used the QSYSMSG message queue since it gets used by the operating system for security related events.  But, you can use any message queue that works for you.

Problems may arise, however, in a couple of areas that you need to be prepared for.  I have created this CL program on my system and have accommodated these issues.  See the end of this tip if you’d like a copy of my source.

For starters, your system may already have an initial program set up for the user profile.  If that’s the case, then you will need to create a data area and store those values before you change the initial program setting.  In my sample program, I’ve created a data area with the same name as the user profile in a special library.  The data area is 20 characters long and contains the initial program and library associated with the user profile before my tracking program is set up for the profile.  Since you want this to work for any user profile, the CL should check for the data area and, if it is not there, just assume that no initial program processing will be needed.  After you have logged your activity message, just end your CL program by calling the program stored in the data area.

You will have to remember that every user profile will have to be able to run your program.  To make sure this is not an issue, you should have the profile adopt the permissions of a security officer profile.  This is done when you compile the CL program by setting the USRPRF parameter to *OWNER and running the compile under the profile of a security officer.

When everything is set but before you actually change the initial program setting on any profile, test your CL program to make sure it doesn’t fail.  This is one of those areas where it would be very easy to shoot yourself in the foot by implementing without testing.  In the worst case, you might get locked out of your system.  So test, test, test before you run with it.

Once implemented, then all you need to do is monitor the message queue.  As users that you are tracking sign on, a message will show up in the message queue.  Using the HELP or F1 key will also give you a date and time stamp of when the activity happened.  If you want, you can also expand the information captured and reported by including other information from the Retrieve Job Attributes command such as job name, job number, etc.

If you have any questions about this topic, or if you would like a copy of my sample CL program, you can reach me at (rich at kisco.com),  I’ll send the CL along and try to answer any questions you may have.  All email messages will be answered.

In this day and age, security officers can also access your system by means other than using a terminal session.  To capture this activity, you will have to implement exit point solutions.  This can be a daunting exercise, but our SafeNet/i software in it’s Lite version, is a very affordable solution to this problem.  It is available for a free 30 day trial if you’re interested.

Making Sense of the IBM i Security Audit Journals

By Rich Loeber

To track security events on your IBM i, the i/OS has quite nicely provided an extensive security audit journal function to help you.  When you have security auditing active on your system, all sorts of relevant security information is regularly stored in your system security audit journal that will help you to know what’s going on with your system.  This is a great feature for the IBM i OS, but capturing the audit information and then using it in a meaningful way are two different things.

This tip will just scratch the surface of how you can start to make some sense out of all the information that is stored with your system security audit journal.

The secret that starts the process of unlocking the system audit journal is the Display Journal (DSPJRN) command.  To work with the system audit journal, run this command for the journal named QAUDJRN.

The command defaults to displaying information to your terminal screen.  This is a hard way to wade through the information, although there are any number of filters that you can use to limit the information displayed.

A better way to work with this information is to run the Display Journal command using one of the options that transfers the journal information into a normalized database file.  This is done by selecting the option OUTPUT(*OUTFILE).  When you do this, you will have to specify the format for the output file.  There are five different formats offered, from *TYPE1 through *TYPE5.  You can use the HELP function to see the difference.  Each higher number format builds on the information in the base *TYPE1 format.  If you’re just starting, the *TYPE1 format should be sufficient.

Once you have your database built, then it is time to start analyzing it to see just what you have recorded in your security audit journal.  For starters, I recommend that you run summary reports on fields like the Entry Type, Job Name, User Profile and so on to see how many records you have in your current journal with various values.  On our test system here, I do this with the old “Query Two Step” of summarizing the information to a file and then reporting that file.  I have some Query definitions that I’ve created for this purpose that I would be happy to share with you in a save file that you can restore to your system.  If you’d like a copy, just let me know by email (rich at kisco.com) and I’ll send them to you.

As you work with the databases that you’ve created and the various analysis reports that you work with, you will also need to have a copy of the IBM i Security Manual handy.  There are at least 100 pages in the Appendix (on ours, it is Appendix F) that describe all of the information in the various database formats, not to mention the codes that can be contained and what they mean.  On our system, I’ve even found codes in the security audit journal that are not documented in the Security Manual.  In that case, the next stop is IBM support.

If the tasks seems too daunting for you, I’m certain that you will not be the first security officer who has thrown in the towel on analyzing this audit journal.  There are a number of third party software solutions that have taken the time to do all of the necessary investigation and one of them might just fill the bill for you, not to mention lowering your blood pressure.

Auditing Power User Activity

By Rich Loeber

I regularly hear from IBM i shops where users, especially programmers, claim that they absolutely must have access to all objects to get through a normal work day.  There are also many shops where certain users claim that they need to be defined to the system as security officers to get their jobs done.  Now, we all know that this is just not true, but some shops cave in and provide these authority levels as a form of appeasement.  So, if you’re the security officer in one of these shops, it is really incumbent on you to know two things:

  1. What profiles have these special authorities
  2. What those profiles are up to on your system

Fortunately, in the IBM i world, you can give someone the keys to the kingdom, but also have the system watch over their shoulder.

The first step is to identify the users that need watching.  To do this, run a Display User Profile (DSPUSRPRF) command for all profiles using the *OUTFILE option to create a database that you can analyze.  The basic information option is sufficient for your purposes.  Using the new file just created, write a Query report (or any similar database reporting tool you may have) to select all profiles with the user class field set to *SECOFR or that have the values *ALLOBJ and *SECADM in the list of special authorities.  This will give you your list of profiles that need watching.

The rest of this tip assumes that you have security auditing active on your system.  If you don’t, drop me a line and I’ll let you know how to get this active on your system.

Your next step is to check the system value QAUDLVL and make a note of the specific audit values that are already being logged on your system.  For those profiles that you specifically now want to track all security activity, you will then need to use the Change User Auditing (CHGUSRAUD) command to add all of the audit values that are not currently listed in the QAUDLVL system value.  This will ensure that all actions by these users will be included in the security journal.

Now, for those users that are particularly savvy, you will want to remove their ability to change the system auditing that you have just imposed on their profiles.  You can do this by removing the *AUDIT special authority on their profile.  Chances are excellent that they will never notice that this is gone, and by removing it, they will not be able to undo what you’ve just set up.  A note of caution, you will not be able to remove this from the QSECOFR profile.  Make sure that the password for this profile is not generally known as that could also defeat your objectives.

Lastly, check the system value QAUDCTL and make sure that it is set to the special value *AUDLVL.  If it is not already set to this value, check around before making the change to make sure that you will not end up shooting yourself in the foot by making this change.

Now that you have all the pieces in place, you will find all of the information you need to do to track these users in the system security journal.  Use the Display Journal (DSPJRN) command to display the information or move it into a database file on a regular basis for reporting and analysis purposes.  You will find information in the iSeries Security Manual on how to process information from the security journal and how to interpret the codes and other information available there.

If you have any questions about this topic, you can reach me at (rich@kisco.com), I’ll give it my best shot.  All email messages will be answered.

Restoring Your Security Configuration

By Rich Loeber

I recently wrote about saving your security configuration.  Once you’ve got your system backed up including all of the security information, what’s the best way to make sure that all of that security information is restored correctly when you have to do a full system restore.  Missing something or getting things in the wrong sequence could result in your objects being restored without the security configuration that you want.

First, you will need to plan the sequence of events in your restore operation.  For security to come out right, you should always restore your saved user profiles first.  The second task is then to restore the objects to your system.  Lastly, once the profiles and objects have all been restored, you should restore the private authorities to objects.

Let’s take a look at how to accomplish each of these steps in a way the makes certain that your security settings are all preserved.  As a safeguard, make sure you have access to the password for the QSECOFR profile on the system being restored.  You should have access to the current password and the password being restored.  If you have any serious security issues during the restore, you may have to logon as QSECOFR as a recovery option, so having access to these passwords may become critical.

To restore your saved user profiles, use the Restore User Profiles (RSTUSRPRF) command.  If you are restoring all user profiles, you should be aware that all settings for each profile will be based on the saved version of that profile.  If any changes have been made to a profile and you are restoring to the same system, those changes will be lost.  Also, make sure that the user profile being used to do the restore has both all object (*ALLOBJ) and security administrator (*SECADM) special authorities.  Otherwise, any profiles being restored with *ALLOBJ special authority could have that authority stripped during the profile restore operation.  This will not affect critical IBM Q profiles, in case you’re worried.

Once your user profiles are successfully restored, the next step is to get your objects restored.  You can use any of the following commands to restore objects on your system:

•    Restore Library (RSTLIB)
•    Restore Object (RSTOBJ)
•    Restore Configuration (RSTCFG)
•    Restore Object (RST) – for objects in the IFS
•    Restore Document Lib Object (RSTDLO) – for objects in shared folders (QDLS)

When restoring objects, be careful how you use the “Allow object differences” (ALWOBJDIF) parameter.  If you attempt to restore an object that already exists on the system and the object being restored is owned by a different profile than that being restored, the allow object differences command setting of *NONE will result in the object not being restored.  If you use a value of *ALL, then the object will be restored and the system owner will be preserved.

Also, you need to be aware that there are special considerations for public authority and authorization list values during object restores.  Generally, if an object is being restored that already exists on the system, the current object settings are preserved rather than applying those from the saved object.  For objects secured by authorization lists, the ALWOBJDIF parameter can result in objects not being restored when there is a difference between the current value and that being restored.  There is a thorough discussion of what is restored and not restored in the Security Reference Manual, Chapter 8.  Check on the issues of private authorities, object auditing, authority holders and more for these considerations.

To restore authorities, it is recommended that you run the Restore Authority (RSTAUT) command after all objects have been restored.  This will rebuild the object authorities in the user profiles.  Your restore will not be complete until this step is done.

Saving Your Security Configuration

By Rich Loeber

As your IBM i shop’s security officer, you’ve developed a security policy; analyzed the user base; classified the various points of information access and implemented your policy to protect the data assets on your system. You have a current user profile base that you’re maintaining on a regular basis. When new applications come along, you review the security requirements and make sure that they can fit within your established policies. You probably even have a plan in place for offsite backup storage for your shop with a regular schedule of backups and tape rotations.

But, have you given thought to how your security policies are stored on your system and how they figure into your backup process? If not, you might be in for a rude awakening when you need to restore your system following a catastrophic system loss. This tip will take a look at how the various pieces of your security implementation are stored on your IBM i processor. A future tip will then look at how your can make sure that your security setup can be restored successfully.

Your security configuration is stored in three different places on your IBM i server. You should be familiar with these storage locations and how they relate to your security implementation.

Some security information is stored with individual objects. These include things like public authority settings, who owns the object, what the owner’s authority to the object is, group authorities to the object, the name of any authorization list that applies to the object along with private authority information.

In addition to the security information stored with each individual object, there is also a wealth of security information stored with your user profiles. This information includes user profile attributes, the profile’s UID (User Identification Number) and GID (Group Identification Number), private authority information to objects, object ownership information, group profile information, profile auditing information and information about registered functions for the profile.

Lastly, there is security information stored with existing authorization lists on your system. This includes a list of objects secured by the list along with other normal authority information to be considered for objects secured by the list.

When you save the objects on your system, only part of the security information is getting backed up to tape. In order to get a complete backup of your system, including all of the current security information, you must not only save the objects, you must also save the security information. This requires using the Save Security Data (SAVSECDTA) command. This command will backup the user profiles, authorization lists and any authority holders that you have in your security configuration. Only when both the objects and the associated security data for your system are saved will you get a full backup of your security implementation.

There are some restrictions on the use of the SAVSECDTA command, so if you introduce it into your save/restore plan now, make sure that you understand those restrictions and accommodate them. Of special concern is the PRECHK parameter and the possibility that it could abnormally terminate your backup operation. See the HELP text associated with the SAVSECDTA command for more information.

IBM i Security New Year’s Resolutions

By Rich Loeber

Many people, self included, take this time of year for a little introspection.  We try to see where we have problems or weaknesses and then contemplate methods and strategies to make changes.  If we’re serious, we’ll sit down and make a list of things to do in the New Year.  As the security officer for your IBM i shop, this is a good opportunity to do just that for your installation and here’s my list of some items you should consider.

  • Finally take the plunge and move the security level of your system up at least one level.  If you’re running at level 20 (shame on you!), move to level 30.  If you’re at level 30, move to level 40.  Take the time to plan the move and use system security auditing to check results before you make the change.
  • Check your system for user profiles with permanent passwords; then change them all.  This will, at least, enforce an annual change in these passwords.  And, this means your personal password too!
  • Review the user profiles on your system and look for people who have left the company.  Make sure those profiles are disabled and their passwords have been changed to *NONE.  If you can do so easily, remove the profiles.
  • Review all user profiles with the *ALLOBJ special authority or *SECADM/*SECOFR user class.  Verify that each profile has a valid business reason for these high level access permissions.
  • Do a full audit of all of the security related system values on your box and make sure they are set up to enforce your company’s security policies correctly.
  • Audit your system backup plan and make sure that the tapes are being properly labeled and stored for quick and accurate recovery if needed.
  • Check on the way your backup tapes are transported to and from your off-site storage facility to make sure they are secure in transit.
  • Dust off your Disaster Recovery plan and make sure it still works.  Bring it up to date, then schedule an actual test.
  • Review physical security arrangements for your computer room and for all devices attached to your system.  Do a walk thru and actually look at the various work locations.  Check for things like passwords on post-it notes and lists of system resources.  Spank a few hands (not literally) for violators.  Your physical presence in the end-user’s environment will go a long way towards reinforcing the importance of security.
  • Resolve to review your system security audit journal on a regular basis.  If you don’t have it active, turn it on.  If you have it turned on but never look at it, develop a review process to check for problem issues.
  • If you don’t have network security implemented at the exit point level on your system, commit to getting this done in the new year.  Either write your own exit routines or take a look at one of the many packages available for this important area of system security.  If you’re new to this, take a good look at Kisco’s SafeNet/i Exit Point solution.

If you have other items to add to the list, let me know by email.  I’d love to hear about your new year’s resolutions.

For me, I’m going to just resolve to loose 20 pounds this year.  But then, that was my resolution last year and I’m weighing in at the same rate this year.  At least things didn’t get worse.  Let’s hope that your system security resolutions fare better.

Blocking Object Access

By Rich Loeber

I am often asked specific questions by readers about a situation in their shop. I enjoy hearing from readers about their real-life situations. One of the most frequent questions I hear is “How do I keep a specific user from accessing certain data files on my system?”.

The answer depends a many variables. First of all, if the user you want to block has been set up with all object authority at the user profile level (SPCAUT containing the *ALLOBJ setting), then there is really nothing you can do at the operating system level to block access. This is a frequent song that I sing, but there should be precious few user profiles on your system with this level of access. And, you should have some pretty good business reasons for granting it to those profiles where this level is supported.

Assuming that this is not an issue, then the easiest way to block access to a specific file is to edit the authority for that object using the Edit Object Authority (EDTOBJAUT) command. Add an entry for the user profile you want to block and set it to *EXCLUDE. If you want to block everyone except certain users, then set the *PUBLIC access to the object to *EXCLUDE and specifically authorize the profiles where access needs to be granted.

If your object is secured by an authorization list, then you should to make these changes to the associated authorization list. The list in force is shown when you edit the object authority. Having your object authority controlled by an authorization list is a good idea as it lets you make security changes at any time, not just when the object is not in use. Also, you can secure multiple objects with the same authorization list thereby simplifying your security administration task.

If you decide that you want to block access to all the files in a given library, then you can edit the object authority for the library. Adding public *EXCLUDE access authority at the library level will extend to all objects within the library. Remember, this will extend to all objects in the library, not just data file objects. This could be a concern for you depending on how your applications are implemented.

You can also exclude users from accessing objects that are stored in the Integrated File System (IFS). In the IFS, you can specify *EXCLUDE authority for any object for a given user profile. From the command line, you can work with IFS security from the WRKLNK command. From iSeries Access, the security functions are also available and may be easier to work with for you.

Lastly, if you have a whole group of people where you want to block access, consider placing them all into a group on your system. If you are already using group profiles and your blocking scheme does not match up with your current group implementation, then you can set up the users to be blocked in a supplemental group. The IBM i/OS provides for up to 14 supplemental groups for each user profile on the system giving you a lot of flexibility. Remember, doing things at the group level reduces your security administration overhead.

 

Adopted Authority Basics

By Rich Loeber

On your IBM i, every object is owned by a user profile, even if it is just a system default owner profile.  As objects are created, the ownership is established by the person who creates the object.  When new objects are added to your system that were created on a different system, such as third party software or objects restored to your system from another IBM i, the ownership that was in effect on the other system is carried over onto your system.

Program objects have a unique aspect of ownership that many programmers and users of IBM’s i/OS may not be aware of.  There is a setting in each *PGM object on your system that controls authority checking whenever that *PGM object is executed.  This is controlled by the USRPRF parameter when the program is compiled.  For existing programs, it can be changed by the CHGPGM command.

The default setting for the various compilation commands in i/OS, as shipped from the factory, sets the USRPRF parameter to the value “*USER”.  This means that when that program runs, the security settings are checked according to the user profile in effect for the user who actually runs the program.  This is the intuitive setting that you would normally want to have in effect.  When a user runs a program, you only want them to have access to objects on your system that they are authorized to work with.  If they run a program that they are not supposed to be using; one that accesses objects they are not authorized for, then you want the OS security to kick in an prevent the object access.  As long as your programs are set to *USER for the USRPRF parameter, then this is exactly what will happen.

The alternate setting for the USRPRF parameter in programs is *OWNER.  When this is specified, then the program is said to “adopt” the security settings for the user profile that owns the *PGM object (regardless of who is running the program).  So, using this method, someone with fairly limited security authorization can run a program and access objects that they are not normally cleared for.  A good example of when this is desirable would be with a payroll application where a clerk is cleared for file maintenance under program control but you don’t want them to have access to the payroll files for any other purposes.  By having the maintenance program adopt the authority of the program owner, you can accomplish this with ease.

So, what’s the problem then with adopted authority?

The problem is that it can be misused and, under certain circumstances, open your system to abuse.  Because of this, you need to know which programs on your system use adopted authority and then check those programs to make sure that they are well behaved and don’t break any of the generally accepted rules for programs of this type.

As an example, having a program that uses adopted authority which is owned by a user profile with *ALLOBJ authority could lead to a security exposure.  If that program contained an option to display an open command line, then the user could gain access to your entire system.  When reviewing this situation, it is important to remember that not only can security authority be adopted, it can also be inherited.  This happens when a program with adopted authority is run and then calls another program deeper in the program stack.  That called program will inherit the adopted authority of the program that called it from higher up in the program call stack.  This inheriting feature is only in effect for a single call level.  If your called program then, in turn, calls a third program, then the inherit feature is no longer in effect.

IBM’s i/OS contains a reporting feature that will allow you to review programs that adopt authority so you can see where your possible exposures may lie.  The Print Adopting Objects  (PRTADPOBJ) command will let you review this on-line or via a printed report.  It is run by user profile and, at a minimum, you should take a look at all of your user profiles that have *ALLOBJ authority.

This just scratches the surface of the issues associated with programs that adopt their owner’s authority.  For additional research, take a long look at the IBM i Security Manual.  It will show you ways to limit the use of adopted authority and provide additional insights into the issues presented.

More Control over User Profiles

By Rich Loeber

No matter how good your office procedures are for setting up, enabling, disabling and removing users from your system, there is always room for error.  There is nothing like a quick check of your user profile base to help keep your user profiles in good order.  The user profile is a key that lets people into your system and keeping the keys in order is, or should be, a primary obligation of your security controls.

For many of us who have been doing this for a while, the quick review takes the form of a session with the WRKUSRPRF command using the *ALL option.  But, this is a tedious process at best and you can easily miss something important this way.  The ideal would be to get the user profile information organized into various views to focus in on the myriad aspects of security that exist in today’s IBM i world.

Fortunately, IBM’s i/OS contains a facility to help you with this.  The command “Print User Profile” (PRTUSRPRF) has the ability to generate up to four different format reports that will organize your user profile information base to give you a good overview.  The report information for the four different reports concentrate on:

  • Authority type information
  • Environment type information
  • Password type information
  • Password level type information (V5R1 and higher only)

The command has up to four parameters to control the information presented on the listings.  Some of these parameters are context sensitive and will not always be prompted depending on other values you enter.  In addition to indicating which of the four report formats you want, you can also narrow your selection of the specific user profiles to be included, thereby letting you analyze like profiles together.  These selection options let you limit the reports to only users with specific special authority settings and users for specific user classes.  You will probably want to start by specifying all users, but if you’re in a very large shop, this may produce too much information for you to be able to focus in on.

The four reports, however, are the key to using this tool effectively.  The report on authority type information shows each selected profile along with a reference to any group profile or supplemental groups that the profile belongs to.  Then, the special authorities in effect for the user are shown along with their user class, the user profile object ownership setting and other object ownership related information.  A quick scan of this report can quickly show you users that are categorized in an incorrect group, users who are in a group that gives them more access rights than you really intend and many other options.

The report on environment type information presents a different report format.  This report focuses in on the job execution environment in place for each user profile.  These things include the current library, initial menu/library, default job description and other settings that control how jobs run by each user profile will be setup by your system.  This report lets you do a quick audit of user profiles to make sure that they are set up for just the work they should be doing and no more.

The third report produces password type information.  This report lists the current enabled/disabled status of each profile, the current number of invalid signon attempts, the last signon, when their password was last changed and more information that will help with administration of password controls.  In preparing this article, I discovered some unusual values on this report that seemed to indicate someone attempting to gain access to our test system via Telnet using the QSRV and QSYSOPR user profiles.  Both profiles were disabled and the not-valid signon attempts were at the maximum.  Since nobody uses these profiles in our shop, I can only conclude that an illegal signon attempt was made for both of these.  Fortunately, it appears that these attempts failed since we do not have the default passwords still active for any of the IBM supplied ‘Q’ user profiles.  Using this report, you can perform a very quick scan of the setup for each user and quickly spot anomalies, like I did.

The fourth report prints a report on password level type information.  Under the more recent versions of i/OS, you can optionally use longer passwords (up to 128 bytes long) and you can specify a controlled switch over from one setup to another.  This fourth report supplies you with information on how this extended password level is configured for each user on your system.  You can see additional information about this on the system value QPWDLVL and by using the DSPSECA command on these systems.

These four reports, and their various mutations when you use the filtering options, will give you a good tool in keeping current on the status of the user profile pool on your system.  A monthly review of the first three reports would be in order and you can simplify this by just loading these commands into your system job scheduler to automatically run on a monthly basis.

Getting Control over User Profiles

By Rich Loeber

Every IBM i shop has the potential to have active user profiles on the system for users who have left the company.  Unless your personnel department is extra careful about global notifications when people leave, then you may have a security exposure that you don’t even know about.

You can, if you’re careful about setting up user profiles, take care of this problem when new profiles are created.  The “Password expiration interval” (PWDEXPITV) parameter on the Create User Profile (CRTUSRPRF) command lets you set up a separate expiration day interval for each user.  On a system-wide basis, you can also enforce a default expiration interval with the system value QPWDEXPITV.  Using the system value, you just have to use the default *SYSVAL setting for the PWDEXPITV parameter for each user profile.  I suspect that a lot of shops use this arrangement.

However, in every shop, there are users who have passwords that are set to never expire.  This is not recommended, but may make sense for some people who can closely guard their password and use the system heavily.  (I know many programmers and system operators who enjoy this luxury.)  For these people, simply relying on the password expiration interval won’t work, leaving you an even more serious exposure since the type of people who want permanent passwords also tend to have broad access to your system.

The good news is that IBM’s i/OS contains a way for you to enforce periodic expiration on user profiles that have not been used for a specified period of time.  There are several i/OS commands that will help you to enforce a policy of automatically forcing unused profiles to inactive status by disabling them.

The “Analyze Profile Activity” (ANZPRFACT) command will let you set up and control the number of days that the system should use to check for unused profiles.  Then, after this has been set, the system will scan the active profiles on your system once per day and disable those that have not been used for the specific period of time.  Before you start to use this, however, be sure to read on.  (Note, you can disable this check by running this command again and changing the setting to *NOMAX.)

The “Display Active Profile List” (DSPACTPRFL) command will let you display a list of specific profiles that the ANZPRFACT command will ignore when it is checking for unused profile activity.  These might be certain profiles that own object code on your system but are not actually used for signon purposes.  Some applications may require that these owner profiles remain active on your system.  This may be particularly true of third party software.

The “Change Active Profile List” (CHGACTPRFL) command lets you modify this list of profiles on your system.  You can use this command to add or remove entries from the list.  It is important to note that most Q profiles (IBM profiles) are automatically excluded from ANZPRFACT processing.  If you prompt the ANZPRFACT  command and use the HELP facility, you can access a quick list of the Q profiles that are excluded.

It is important for you to check the list (DSPACTPRFL) and update the list (CHGACTPRFL) before any regularly scheduled analysis processing takes place.  This will make sure that you don’t shoot yourself in the foot by disabling a user profile that needs to remain active.  If you use third party software on your system, check with each developer to find out if their ownership profile needs to remain enabled on your system.  Some third party software won’t care of the profile is disabled, but it is important to get the developer’s blessing before taking this step.  If you do have an owner profile that needs to remain enabled, you can always prevent user logon attempts by changing the password to *NONE.